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COMMENTS
IMMUNITY STATUTE: EFFECT OF SELF-INCRIMINATION
CLAUSE OF FIFTH AMENDMENT
By MARVIN J. CHRISTIANSEN
In 1954, Public Law 600 was passed by Congress amending Title 18,
United States Code, section 3486. This comment is concerned with subsection
3486(c) of the amending statute in respect to grand jury proceedings.'
The case of In re Ullman,2 the first decision based on that subsection, has
raised controversial questions as to the extent of a citizen's rights under the
fifth amendment. In that case, the witness refused to testify under the
immunity statute because (1) the statute is unconstitutional and in contra-
vention of his rights under the fifth amendment by requiring him to be a
witness against himself and (2) the statute is invalid in that the grant of
immunity is not sufficiently protective to compensate for his privilege against
self-incrimination. The purpose of this comment is to present an analysis
of the pertinent law and policies raised by the witness' contentions.
Privilege Against Self-incrimination: Its Origin, Evolution and
Ramifications
"No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself"3 is the Constitution's limitation on the Federal
Government's judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. This is the privilege
against self-incrimination which protects an individual from prosecution
and punishment as a consequence of his own compelled testimony. Probably
to the average layman this clause was vague and obscure, if not unknown,
until recent years. Of course, those threatened with prosecution have learned
' 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (c). Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of
any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other evidence by any witness, in any case
or proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United States involving any interference with
or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger, the national security
or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy,
violations of chapter 115 of title 18 of the United States Code, violations of the Internal Security
Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 987), violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 755), as amended,
violations of sections 212(a) (27), (28), (29) or 241(a) (6), (7) or 313(a) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 182-186; 204-206; 240-241), and conspiracies involving any of the
foregoing, is necessary to the public interest, he, upon the approval of the Attorney General, shall
make application to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify or produce evidence
subject to the provisions of this section, and upon order of the court such witness shall not be
excused from testifying or from producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that the
testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty
or forfeiture. But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture
for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, nor shall
testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding (except prosecution
described in subsection (d) hereof) against him in any court.
2 128 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).8 U. S. CONsT. amend. V.
(72)
to some extent the meaning of the self-incrimination clause, but to many
it has become important only with recent congressional hearings regarding
communist conspiracy. The use of the privilege by witnesses at these hearings
has undoubtedly brought much disrepute upon a privilege that has roots
extending hundreds of years into the past.
As early as 1591, the King's Bench refused to sustain an indictment
for administering the oath on a charge of incontinency, since "the oath
cannot be ministered to the party but where the offence is presented first
by two men."4 We owe much to John Lilburn for his stand on the privilege
in 1637. He was brought before the Council of The Star Chamber in
England for one of their inquisitorial proceedings. Such proceedings were
used to examine one's past to see if he had committed any crime, there being
no real evidence of his guilt. When asked an incriminating question, Lilburn
refused to testify, claiming that the court had no right to force one to testify
against himself. He further demanded that his accusers be presented and
that he would only answer after a formal accusation had been made against
him. The court refused Lilburn's plea and imprisoned him for refusing to
answer. Several years later the holding was reversed by the House of Lords
and Lilburn was freed and granted £3,000 in reparation. Thus, it was
recognized that the Star Chamber had no right to force one to testify against
himself. Thereafter, a statute' was enacted in 1641 declaring that no man
be questioned ex officio by any court exercising spiritual or ecclesiastical
power, authority, or jurisdiction as to any crime. But the common law courts
continued to ask witnesses incriminating questions, feeling the privilege
was restricted to ecclesiastical courts. It was some time before the privilege
was upheld in common law courts.
The privilege at its early stages was considered to be only applicable
to the ordinary witness and not to an accused in as much as the accused
was incompetent to testify.' Thus, no such privilege was necessary to
supplement the rules of evidence. Today an accused is competent to testify,
but the privilege has been extended to cover the accused as well as an ordinary
witness.' The accused has also been given the additional privilege of
refusing to take the stand.'
The framers of our Federal Constitution wanted to be emphatic about
the privilege. Rather than leaving its vindication to judicial stare decisis
they made it a part of the fifth amendment.'0 Forty-six states have similar
'8 WIGBIORE, EVIDENCE, § 2250 (3d ed. 1940).5Id. § 2250.
0 St. 16 Car. I, c. 11, § 4 (1641).
7 WIBIORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2250.
" Town Council v. Owens, 61 S.C. 22, 39 S.E. 184 (1901).
WiGmona, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2250.
" See note 3 supra.
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constitutional provisions." New Jersey has no constitutional provision
against self-incrimination but has a statute which has been construed to
declare the privilege as part of the common law.' 2 Iowa has no constitutional
provision but the due process provision of the Iowa Constitution has been
construed to include the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 Therefore,
every jurisdiction within the United States protects its citizens against com-
pelled testimony.
Various arguments have been advanced to justify the privilege. It is
considered uncivilized to force one to testify against oneself. Law enforce-
ment agencies should convict by the use of real evidence. Without the
protection of the fifth amendment, law enforcement officers might resort to
the rack and screw instead of obtaining real evidence. Although a voluntary
confession has been always considered a valid aid to law enforcement, it is
obtained without compulsion and duress.
Many courts interpreted the constitutional provision to clearly limit
the privilege to an accused in a criminal proceeding. An early New York
case held that such a constitutional clause meant an actual trial of the
accused. 4 But, this holding not only left the clause meaningless; it was
historically wrong. The constitutional privilege was not necessary for an
accused because he was either incompetent to testify or had the privilege
to refuse to testify by rules of evidence. Historically, the protection was
meant to prevent general questioning of one not accused of a crime in
an attempt to find some unlawful act in his past. Later, courts realized this
error and construed the provision to be a restatement of the common law.
A leading case, Counselman v. Hitchcock, 5 held the privilege to be applicable
to a grand jury proceeding.
"If Counselman had been guilty of the matters inquired of in the
questions which he refused to answer, he himself was liable to criminal prose-
cution under the act. The case before the grand jury was therefore a
criminal case."' 6
The privilege has been extended to civil cases and is now recognized
where a witness is before any official hearingY
The constitutional provision has been construed as allowing a witness
to claim the privilege when an answer to a question would tend to incriminate
him of a crime. A recent Supreme Court decision'8 has gone further in
holding that as long as the answer would be a link in the chain of convicting
1 118 A.L.R. 602.
12 In re Vince, 2 N.J. 443, 67 A.2d 141 (1949).
"Koonck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W.2d 269 (1952).
14 People v. Kelly, 24 N.Y. 74, 21 How. Pr. 54 (1861).
' 142 U.S. 547 (1891).
10 Id. at 562.
,WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, § 2250.
'8 Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
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evidence, the witness may claim the privilege. Although some courts allow
the witness to decide if the answer will tend to incriminate him, the prevailing
view and especially the federal view is that the court decides whether the
witness has the right to claim the privilege at that time. In absence of
immunity statutes, there is a tendency for the courts not to charge a witness
with contempt for claiming the privilege.'"
Emspak v. United States20 illustrates the extensive protection of the
privilege. In that case, the court's opinion, stated by Chief Justice Warren,
was that, under the circumstances, questions as to communist affiliations
were incriminatory. The court so held despite the absence of any law against
being a communist, although there is a law against subversion. This holding
has made it possible for recent witnesses before congressional committees
to claim the privilege without fear of being in contempt of Congress, if
they are in a similar situation to the witness in the above holding.
The rights of individuals have been protected under the privilege to
the extent of disallowing comment as to the accused's refusal to testify.2
It is felt that to allow comment would prejudice the accused's position in
the eyes of the jury. California allows comment on a refusal to testify, but
it was deemed necessary to pass a constitutional amendment22 in order to
reach that result.
Immunity Grants: Prosecution's Circumvention of
Fifth Amendment
The privilege was originally instituted for the protection of the inno-
cent; it has also been a shield of the guilty. Prosecutors, feeling that it was
better to give immunity to one person in order to get sufficient evidence
against others, started promising immunity against prosecution if the witness
would testify. This was the inception of immunity grants which in turn gave
way to immunity legislation. Under modern practices, immunity without
legislation has not gained much approval. Even in Texas, where non-legis-
lative immunity is recognized, there is a requirement of court approval before
there is an effective immunity.2" The prevailing view in the United States
is that a court cannot grant a valid immunity without a statute giving them
such authority. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Ford4 that the
district attorney had no authority to contract so that one accused of an
offence would not be prosecuted if he discloses his guilt while testifying
against accomplices; the most the accused could except is an equitable title
19 See note 15 supra.
20 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
'12 Mo. L. Rav. 78, 85 (1937).
22 CAL. CONST. Art. I, § 13.
-Reagan v. State, 49 Tex. Crim. 443, 93 S.W. 733 (1906).2, 99 U.S. 594 (1879).
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to executive mercy. Cardozo, whose opinions have been the foundation of
much of our present law, stated, "The grant of immunity is in every truth
the assumption of a legislative power." 25
As a result of similar holdings requiring legislative immunity, the
federal and state legislatures accelerated the passage of immunity statutes
covering specific crimes. Some of the more important immunity statutes
have involved testimony regarding violations of the laws of bribery,
gambling, prohibition, interstate commerce and monopoly. Recently there
has been increased legislation to alleviate the burden on Congressional
investigating bodies in obtaining testimony from witnesses before them.
Many of these immunity statutes merely prevented the testimony from
being used against the witness in the same jurisdiction. A statute cannot
amend the Constitution, but, if a statute gives the witness as much protection
as the Constitution it is felt that it is valid because a witness would lose
nothing by testifying.
To be commensurate with the Constitution, the immunity must give
protection against future prosecution in the same jurisdiction in regards
to that material disclosed by the compelled testimony. The trend towards
this holding was a result of the Counselman v. Hitchcock decision.26 In that
case, the Supreme Court held section 860 of the revised statutes to be insuffi-
cient because it only protected against future use of the testimony to gain
a conviction. Many persons have argued that the constitutional provision
that one shall not be a witness against himself is satisfied by preventing
the testimony being used. They reasoned that the prosecution is not using
coerced evidence to convict the accused. But the better opinion would seem
to be that set forth in the Counselman case to the effect that although the
testimony could not be used the prosecution could still get leads from it to
get other evidence with which to prosecute. Thus, the witness would indirectly
convict himself.
Prior to the famous decision of Counselman v. Hitchcock, many courts27
held that an immunity statute granting protection against the use of testimony
was commensurate with the self-incrimination clause of the Constitution
and therefore valid. But this viewpoint would appear to have been abrogated
by the Counselman decision.
Another issue that arose over these immunity statutes was whether or
not the witness had to claim immunity if the statute did not specifically
require such a request. A few of the lower federal courts" held that the
"Doyle v. Hofstader, 257 N.Y. 244, 261; 177 N.E. 489 (1931).
"6 See note 15 supra.
27 United States v. McCarthy, 18 F. 87 (S.D. N.Y. 1883) ; Ex Parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 184 (1857).
"8 United States v. Daisart, 169 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1948); United States v. Elton, 222 F. 428
(S.D. N.Y. 1915) ; United States v. Skinner, 218 F. 870 (S.D. N.Y. 1914).
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witness did not get the benefit of the immunity statute where he had not
requested immunity even though he appeared by virtue of a subpoena.
Their argument was that the immunity statute should be no broader than
the self-incrimination clause. To get the benefit of the self-incrimination
clause one must claim the privilege. But the prevailing view in the state
courts seemed to be that appearing by subpoena was an involuntary appear-
ance; therefore, the immunity should apply even though the witness does not
specifically request it. United States v. Pardue29 represented the view of
most lower federal courts. That case dealt with the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, which made it a criminal offense to refuse to attend and testify
before the commission. It held the provision of section 9 that "no natural
person shall be prosecuted . . . for or on account of any transaction, matter
or thing concerning which he may testify or produce evidence .. . before
the commission in obedience to a subpoena issued by it"" must be construed
in accordance with its plain language; if a witness appear in obedience to
a subpoena and is placed on the stand by the government, the fact of compul-
sion is prima facie established. Thus, to entitle him to the immunity
expressly given, it is not necessary that he should claim it before the com-
mission. The Supreme Court 1 followed the Pardue view by holding that
a person gets immunity without requesting it, since the statute did not require
requesting of immunity if the appearance was in obedience to a subpoena.
But it would appear that to get the immunity the witness must abide by
the statute. Consequently, Sherwin v. United States32 held that the statute
giving immunity to a person subpoenaed and forced to testify did not apply
when the person who gave the testimony was not subpoenaed and did not
request immunity.
It would have been best to follow the view that the witness must claim
the immunity, because the immunity statutes were intended to force persons
to testify who relied on the self-incrimination privilege. Their intention was
not to give free immunity to everyone but only to circumvent the self-incrimi-
nation clause.
Because the courts began holding that an immunity statute that merely
prevented the testimony from being used in a future trial was not sufficient
immunity to compel the witnesses to testify, legislatures started passing
immunity statutes which prevented prosecution in respect to matters disclosed
by the compelled testimony. Some of the state courts held that even this
was no sufficient if there was possible federal prosecution as a result of the
testimony. Michigan appears to have approved the idea that the immunity
29 294 F. 543 (S.D. Tex. 1923).
0 Ihid.
a United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943).
82 268 U.S. 369 (1924).
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statute must given protection against possible federal prosecution. 3 The
court stated in In re Watson 4 that after a review of the authorities and a
consideration of the constitutional provisions and the principles involved,
they were of the opinion that the privilege against self-incrimination exoner-
ates one from testifying whenever there is a probability of prosecution in
state or federal jurisdictions. In an early federal action " Chief Justice
Marshall commented that the rule clearly is that a party is not bound to
make any disclosures which would expose him to state penalties. The court
in Smith v. United States36 stated that undoubtedly it is true that the immunity
granted by the National Prohibition Act must, in order to comply with the
fifth amendment, afford protection from prosecution in the state courts and
cited Brown v. Walker. 7 Although Brown v. Walker declared that federal
law is supreme, and that the words of the immunity statute were general
and therefore should cover state prosecution, it did not declare that it had
to cover state prosecution and in fact stated that such immunity was not
required. A recent lower federal court decision,"8 which involved testimony
from the Kefauver hearings concerning nationwide crime, held that the
privilege against self-incrimination exists in federal courts where there is
question of liability under state law.
The prevailing federal and state view is that an immunity statute
merely preventing prosecution in the immediate jurisdiction is sufficient
immunity to compel the witness to testify. "It should also be noted that
the fifth amendment does not give immunity against a state prosecution as
it does against a federal prosecution." 9 Brown v. Walker,40 the leading
case supporting this view, held that if there is no chance of prosecution in
the state courts, there is no privilege in federal courts against testifying.
Brown v. Walker also decided that an immunity not covering disgrace
is valid. Smith v. United States appears to be in accord with the Walker
decision and the prevailing view, stating that:
"If a witness could not be prosecuted on facts concerning which he
testified, the witness could not fairly say he had been compelled in a criminal
case to be a witness against himself. He might suffer disgrace and humilia-
tion but such unfortunate results to him are outside of constitutional protec-
tion." 4
1
However, a strong dissent by Justice Field in Brown v. Walker stated
People v. DenUyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947).
3,293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940).
" United States v. Saline Bank of Virginia, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 100 (1828).
11 58 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1932).
87 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
" United States v. DiCarlo, 102 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
" United States v. Emspak, 95 F. Supp. 1012, 1018 (D.C. 1951).
,See note 37 supra.
"337 U.S. 137, 147 (1949).
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that the only absolute immunity was absolute silence. "What can be more
abhorrent . . . than to compel a man who has fought has way from obscurity
to dignity and honor to reveal crimes of which he had repented and of which
the world was ignorant."4 There was an old decision to this effect,4"
although it would seem that in the historical background that it was not in
the purview of the self-incrimination clause. The privilege was aimed at
preventing one from convicting 'oneself by his own compelled testimony. Its
purpose was not to protect one's reputation.
The courts have placed some limitations on witnesses acquiring im-
munity. One judicial check is that there is no privilege to commit perjury.
The Supreme Court held that for a statute to be valid it was not necessary
to grant immunity against a possible perjury conviction based upon the
compelled testimony. Also, immunity will not be granted a witness who
gives self-incriminating evidence unless he acts in good faith with the state,
and testifies truthfully and fully.4" Another limitation is that a witness is
not entitled to immunity if no incriminating testimony was given. 6 An
important rule is that one who is required to keep records by law cannot
take advantage of immunity in as much as he had a duty to present the
records irrespective of immunity.
47
Even though there were many checks on the misuse of the immunity
statutes, many took advantage of the statutes to cleanse their criminal records
by testifying under the statutes and thereby absolving themselves of future
punishment for past offenses. Probably as a result of such practices,
Congress, in respect to the statute on subversion, decided to grant immunity
only against the testimony compelled as to subversive activities. Adams v.
Maryland4" stated that this immunity was not commensurate with the self-
incrimination clause. There, the witness had testified in a federal proceeding
in accordance with the immunity statute and was now being prosecuted in
a state court. His contention was that Congress had power to grant immunity
against the testimony being used in state courts and that he was given such
immunity. The court's statement that the immunity was not sufficient would
appear to be dicta. The issue in the case was not whether the immunity
was sufficient, but whether Congress had the power to prevent the testimony
from being used in state courts. It was decided that the statute by using
the words "in any court" intended to cover state courts as well as federal
courts; that the Congress did have such a power under the necessary and
A2 See note 37 supra at 632.
"3 Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 4 Dall. 241 (Pa. 1802).
"Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911).
'5 Scribner v. State, 90 Okla. Crim. 465, 132 P. 933 (1913).
"United States v. Markman, 193 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1952).
"Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1947).
"347 U.S. 179 (1953).
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proper clause of the Federal Constitution. It was held necessary and proper
to provide immunity where it was in the public interest for national defense
to force the witnesses to testify. Further, where there is a conflict between
federal and state law in the field of dual jurisdiction, the federal law will
be supreme due to necessity and the supremacy clause of the Federal Consti-
tution.49
Today, it would appear that in order to have a valid federal immunity
statute it is not necessary to grant immunity against possible state prose-
cution, nor to protect an individual from disgrace and infamy. However,
a person must be protected against prosecution and imprisonment in that
jurisdiction which uses compulsion to gain his testimony.
Despite Advocacy to the Contrary, Prior Law, Decisions and Policies
Will Be Upheld
We have reviewed the past. What lies in the future for the self-incrimi-
nation clause and the immunity statutes? The answer may be in the District
Court decision of In re Ullman5" which was the first case involving the new
amendment, subsection 3486(c), respecting grand jury proceedings.
That court affirmed the previous holdings that to be commensurate with
the Constitution, the immunity statute need only protect against prosecution
in federal courts. Since certiorari has been granted, the Supreme Court,
in making their decision, will undoubtedly review the many contentions
previously made that the immunity to be commensurate with the fifth amend-
ment must also protect against state prosecution. There has been the view
that immunity need not be granted against prosecution in another jurisdiction
based on the belief that the prvilege applied only to the laws of that juris-
diction. That may have stemmed from the belief that prosecution in another
jurisdiction was very unlikely to occur. Most of the old decisions did not
involve possible state prosecution. But, today, state prosecution is a possible
consequence of federal compelled testimony. Many states have a law against
syndicalism and sabotage, as does Utah. 1 And Iowa has a penal statute
stating:
Any person who shall become a member of any organization, society,
or order organized or formed, or attend any meeting or council or solicit
others so to do, for the purpose of inciting, abetting, promoting or encour-
aging hostility or opposition to the government of the state of Iowa or to the
United States, or who shall in any manner aid, abet, or encourage any such
organization, society, order, or meeting in the propagation or advocacy of
such a purpose shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 52
" McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
" 128 F. Supp. 617 (S.D. N.Y. 1955).
"
1UTAH PENAL CODE § 76.57.3 (1953).
" IOWA CODE § 689.9 (1954).
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Therefore, if there is a threat of possible state prosecution it would
seem justifiable to require immunity against possible state prosecution.
Does Congress have the power to grant immunity against state prosecu-
tion? The Ullman" court held that Congress did have the power from the
necessary and proper clause of the Federal Constitution; it was necessary
and proper for the national defense to acquire the compelled testimony.
Although Brown v. Walker54 suggested that Congress had the power and the
recent Adams v. Maryland55 case held that Congress had power to prevent
testimony from being used in state courts, there has been much dissent on
this question. Justice Shiras, dissenting in Brown v. Walker, stated:
"It is indeed, claimed that the provisions under consideration would
extend to the state courts, and might be relied on therein as an answer to
such an indictment. We are unable to accede to such a suggestion. As
Congress cannot create state courts, nor establish the ordinary rules of
property and of contracts, nor denounce penalties for crimes and offenses
against the states, so it cannot prescribe rules of proceeding for the state
courts."5 6
"As then, the provision of the constitution of the United States which
protects witnesses from self-incrimination cannot be invoked in a state court,
so neither can the congressional substitute therefor."57
And even in Adams v. Maryland Justice Jackson, in concurring, stated:
"It does not say that Maryland cannot prosecute petitioner; it just says
she shall not put him to disadvantage on the trial by reason of his coopera-
tion with Congress. It leaves Maryland with complete freedom to prosecute
• . . she just has to work up her own evidence and cannot use that worked
up by Congress."5 8
Furthermore, is immunity against state prosecution necessary in order
to compel a federal witness to testify? Stare decisis, as heretofore developed
in this comment, is that a valid federal immunity statute does not have to
grant immunity against state prosecution. Therefore, the granting of im-
munity from state prosecution would not seem to be necessary and proper
for national defense and therefore appears to be an overextension of legis-
lative power.
As to the intent of the Congress in passing this law, there seems to be
much confusion in the legislative history. Senator Kefauver emphasized
before the Senate:
"I think it important, in view of the statement of the distinguished
Senator from Georgia, that we make clear that this bill, at least, in the
s, See note 50 supra.
' See note 37 supra.
n See note 48 supra.
s See note 37 supra at 623.
s Id. at 625.
Z8 See note 48 supra at 184.
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opinion of the Judiciary commitee and of its ablest counsel, would not grant
to a witness immunity from prosecution in a state court." 59
On the other hand, the Judicial Committee opinion was:
"The language of the amendment that no such witness shall be prose-
cuted or subject to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any
transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is so compelled to testify
after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination is sufficiently
broad to ban a subsequent State prosecution if it be determined that the
Congress has the constitutional power to do so."' ' 0
From a general reading of the Congressional Record, it would appear
that, although there was much doubt as to whether Congress had the power,
Congress did feel that the statute was broad enough to cover state prosecution.
The Ullman 1 case also disregarded the plea that the self-incrimination
clause should protect against disgrace and infamy. As previously stated,
the prevailing view had been that the privilege does not protect against
disgrace and infamy. An interesting fact, though, is that in the Court of
Appeals62 decision of the Ullman case each judge felt there was some merit
to the defendant's contention. Judge Frank said:
"We are not prepared to say that this suggestion lacks all merit. But our
possible views on the subject have no significance. . . .Accordingly, the
argument must be addressed not to our ears but to eighteen others in
Washington, D. C."'63
Judge Clark said:
"I concur, but regretfully. For the steady and now precipitate erosion
of the Fifth Amendment seems to me to have gone far beyond anything
within the conception of those justices of the Supreme Court who by the
narrowest of margins first gave support to the trend in the 1890s." '64
And last but not least, Judge Galston said:
"If this matter were one of first impression I could easily reach the
conclusion that the immunity statute in question is in effect a circuitous
attempt to circumvent the Constitution by a short-cut legislative statute
amending the Fifth Amendment." 65
From a legal view, immunity from disgrace and infamy is unnecessary
as the privilege against self-incrimination was never intended to prevent
hurt feelings and disrespect of fellow men. From a practical view, the
federal courts will be very hesitant to require immunity against disgrace
and infamy. If such immunity were required, the immunity statutes in the
" 99 CoNc. REc. 4743 (1953).
6 2 U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3064 (1954).
"' See note 50 supra.
"' United States v. Ullman, 221 F.2d 760 (2d Cir. 1955).
63 Id. at 761, 762.
61 Id. at 763.
65 Ibid.
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federal jurisdiction would be destroyed. Immunity statutes could never give
total immunity against disgrace and infamy because there would be immedi-
ate publication of the compelled testimony in the newspapers.
Congress has taken care of the loophole caused by previous Supreme
Court decisions that mere appearance by subpoena was sufficient to take
advantage of the immunity statutes. Congress has inserted the provision
that the witness must claim the self-incrimination privilege to get the
advantage of the statute. This will make the statute more effective since
the intent of immunity is not to give immunity to everyone, but, rather to
circumvent the privilege by giving immunity to those who refuse to testify.
Also, the provision for approval by the attorney general and a subsequent
court order places a good restriction on the granting of immunity so that
immunity will not be granted freely without supervision.
It does seem that when our national security is at stake that immunity
statutes could be valuable in detecting spies and others attempting to over-
throw our system of government. They act in such a secrecy that it is hard
to get evidence to convict them. Furthermore, immunity statutes have
played a big part in getting convictions of other crimes.
But there has been much consternation caused by these immunity
statutes. One might wonder how far these immunity statutes can go before
they will in effect wipe out the self-incrimination clause. If vague, they
will leave the state courts in much doubt as to just who they can prosecute.
Also, the state prosecutors may have a very good case destroyed overnight
by a federal grant of immunity.
Although the immunity statute has been an aid in convictions, just how
far should they influence constitutional rights?
"The power of inquiry . . .must be exerted with due regard for the
right of witnesses . . . few if any of the rights of the people guarded by
fundamental law are of greater importance to their happiness and safety
than the right to be exempt from all unauthorized, arbitrary or unreasonable
inquiries and disclosures in respect of their person and private affairs." 6
Judge Clark recognized the danger of immunity statutes and declared:
"And realistically viewed there is much in the defendant's contention
that at the end of the road is a charge of perjury supported by the oath of
a renegade or paid informer. Convictions so obtained and punishment thus
decreed cannot satisfy either the need or the ideology of a democratic country
committed to respect and toleration for dissident minorities." 67
The Rogers v. United States6" decision did not help the evidence situ-
ation. It held that once the privilege is considered by the court to be waived
by the witness answering questions, subsequent questions must be answered.
" Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 291, 292 (1929).
'7 See note 62 supra at 763.68 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
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As pointed out by Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School,6 9 who looks
with disfavor on the present statute, that holding will tempt witnesses to
claim the privilege immediately in fear of their privilege being waived.
Maybe the uneasiness caused by communist infiltration can be eased by
other means than compelled testimony. For example, it would seem that
in regard to questioning government employees to determine if they are
a security risk, that the immunity statute would not be needed. Although
one has a constitutional right to claim the privilege, he has no constitutional
right to remain in the service of our government. If he refuses to answer it
would seem that that would be sufficient cause to show that he is not entirely
loyal to the government and could be dismissed. After all, the new statute
appears to be aimed at subversion, and getting rid of the disloyal from
government service would play a big part in carrying out that mission.
I hope the immediate crisis can be met by other methods than by slowly
destroying the fifth amendment. Joseph Welch, counsel for the Army in
the Army-McCarthy hearings, who was faced with much resentment against
the fifth amendment, spoke very aptly when he said:
"Our founding Fathers were familiar enough with the history of the
Middle Ages to know that 'Justice' in that time took some peculiar forms.
They knew that the formal trial of a citizen often began by placing him to
torture, with someone standing by to take down that era's equivalent of a
stenographic transcript of the 'confession' he made in his agony. The tran-
script was then piously and lugubriously produced in court as proof of the
poor devil's guilt.
"The framers of the Bill of Rights were determined that this should
never happen in this fair country of ours and in this spirit, which I can
hardly find blameworthy, they wrote the fifth amendment. Now, to be sure,
the fifth amendment has been resorted to in the intervening years by many
rascals, by many guilty men and doubtless there are persons invoking it today
who will one day be found guilty. But no matter who invokes the amend-
ment, it stands in our Constitution as one of the guardians of our liberties.
It is for all men to use. Guilt will have to be proved in other ways, not in a
way reminiscent of the medieval dungeons.
"It would be a pity if the net effect of these long and laborious hearings,
the confusion and the travail were merely to undermine our Nation's faith
in the document that made the Nation possible. If the phrase 'fifth-amend-
ment Communist' has in anyway eroded your faith in the Bill of Rights, read
it once again, I pray you. '" 70
Conclusion
The law does and will require a valid immunity statute to protect against
prosecution in the immediate jurisdiction. The federal courts may even
require immunity against state prosecution when there is possible state prose-
SGRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 23 (1955).
702 U.S.C. Cong. and Adm. News, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 3068 (1954).
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cution resulting from the compelled testimony. As to protection against
disgrace and infamy, there may be much pity shown by the judges but such
protection has never been given in the past and is doubtful whether it will
be required in the future.
The Ullmani1 case may cause future witnesses to rely on the freedom
of speech clause of the first amendment" to protect cherished ones and
friends from discredit. At that time, it will have to be decided whether or
not the immunity statutes will supersede the first amendment as they have
the privilege against self-incrimination.
See note 2 supra.
"' U.S. CONST. amend. L
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